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Private equity explained: strategies, fund structure, fees and what research shows about returns

In depth10 min read · 19 sources

Private equity is equity capital for companies that are not listed on a stock exchange. It usually flows through funds that raise money from pension funds, foundations, insurers and, increasingly, retail investors, then buy companies, develop them and sell them after a few years. This article explains strategies, fund structure and fees, works through a distribution waterfall with carried interest, and summarises what research knows about returns, dispersion and risks.

What private equity is

In the narrower sense, private equity means buyouts: in a leveraged buyout, according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), a specialised investment firm buys a company with little equity and a lot of debt; these firms now call themselves private equity firms. In the broader sense, growth financing and venture capital are also included. What they all have in common: there is no market price, the stake is held for years, and a large part of the return only arises on exit.

Strategies at a glance

StrategyWhat it doesTypical feature
Buyoutmajority takeover of mature companies, often with a lot of debtleverage, active management, exit after a few years
Growth equityminority stake in growing, often already profitable firmslittle or no leverage, growth rather than restructuring
Venture capitalstakes in young companiesa few big successes drive the result
Secondariespurchase of existing fund interests (LP-led) or of portfolio companies via continuation funds (GP-led)shorter J-curve, price at a discount or premium to NAV
Co-investmentsdirect co-investment alongside a fund in a single buyoutseparate fee terms, concentration risk in a single company
Fund of fundsfund that invests in many private equity fundsbroad diversification, second layer of fees
Evergreen funds and ELTIFsfunds with no fixed term or a long one, also open to retail investorslimited redemptions only, valuation via NAV

Loans to companies in the private equity space are not private equity but private credit or private debt. Funds open to retail investors are described in the article ELTIF and in the glossary under semi-liquid fund.

Fund structure: GP, LP and term

A classic private equity fund is a limited partnership: the manager (general partner, GP) decides on purchases and sales, while the investors (limited partners, LPs) make a capital commitment and are liable only up to their contribution. According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), a fund usually runs for ten years, extendable by up to three years. In the first years, the fund calls capital and invests; after that, it sells the holdings and distributes the proceeds. What this means for cash flows, the J-curve and metrics such as TVPI and IRR is worked through in the article measuring private markets.

How money flows through a private equity fund

The capital commitment is a promise: capital is called gradually in the first years and only distributed after the exits.

Because the money is only called gradually, a fund is never fully invested, and you must be able to pay the outstanding commitment at any time. If you fail to meet a capital call, you are in default. The consequences are set out in the fund agreement. Before the end of the term, you can only sell on the secondary market, at a price that may differ from the NAV.

Fees: management fee, carried interest and hurdle

  • Management fee: according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), a percentage initially of committed capital and later often of invested capital. At 2% on a commitment of 100, that would be 10 over a five-year investment period, regardless of performance.
  • Carried interest: the manager's share of profits, according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) almost always 20% of the profits.
  • Hurdle rate: the preferred return for investors before the carry kicks in; 8% a year in the example below. With a catch-up, the manager then catches up until it has its 20% of the total profit.
  • Waterfall: the order of distribution. In the European model (whole fund), investors first get back all their capital plus the preferred return; in the American model (deal by deal), each holding is settled separately, with a clawback if later losses make the carry retrospectively too high.

How much the fees add up to in total is disputed. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) analysed the agreements of 238 funds: about two thirds of managers' expected revenue comes from fixed components that do not depend on performance. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) estimate the fees at 6% a year, and according to Phalippou (2009), the agreements are opaque and hide costly clauses in the details. Unlike the performance fee of a hedge fund with a high-water mark, the carry depends on realised profits over the entire term.

Worked example: the waterfall

Manager's carry depending on the fund's proceeds

Capital 100, hurdle of 8% over five years (preferred return 46.93) and carry of 20% as in the example above; only the proceeds change. With a full catch-up, the manager has exactly 20% of the profit from proceeds of 158.67; without catch-up, it stays permanently 9.39 below that.

What research shows about returns

  • Kaplan and Schoar (2005): after fees, private equity funds on average achieved roughly the return of the S&P 500, with large differences between funds.
  • Harris et al. (2014): using cash flow data from almost 1,400 US funds, buyout funds outperformed the S&P 500 by 20 to 27% over their life, more than 3% a year; venture capital outperformed in the 1990s and underperformed in the 2000s.
  • Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009): industry figures overstate returns, partly because of inflated valuations of ongoing holdings. After fees, the funds were 3% a year below the S&P 500, and 6% on a risk-adjusted basis.
  • Phalippou (2020): since at least 2006, private equity funds have delivered roughly the return of equity indices; three large datasets show average net multiples of 1.55, 1.57 and 1.63 times capital, which corresponds to about 11% a year. At the same time, an estimated $230 billion in carry was earned.
  • Franzoni et al. (2012): private equity carries the same liquidity risk as equities; the premium for it is about 3% a year, and once it is accounted for, the alpha in the four-factor model disappears.
  • Ilmanen et al. (2020): a leveraged small-cap index is a better benchmark than large-cap stocks; the estimated edge of private equity over equities has declined over time, yet demand has risen.

So the benchmark matters a great deal: against the S&P 500, buyout funds look good; against leveraged small value stocks, the edge shrinks or disappears (Phalippou 2014; L’Her et al. 2016). How to compare correctly (with a public market equivalent instead of IRR against an index return) is shown in measuring private markets.

Dispersion and persistence of managers

There are large differences between funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) also found, unlike for mutual funds, strong persistence of a manager's results across its successor funds. Using more recent data, Harris et al. (2023) show that this still holds for venture capital, but has weakened considerably for buyout funds. What matters is what investors know when they commit: using the interim results of the predecessor fund at the time of fundraising, the authors find hardly any persistence for buyouts, especially after 2000. Interim results are only moderately related to final results, and managers avoid raising money when their interim results are weak.

Access for retail investors

  • Listed private equity companies and ETFs on them: tradable daily, but subject to stock market fluctuations. According to Jegadeesh et al. (2015), they have a beta close to one and more systematic risk than an index built from reported NAVs; the market expected an excess return of between −0.5% and 2% a year for unlisted funds.
  • ELTIFs: EU funds for long-term investments; since the reform (Regulation (EU) 2023/606 2023), there is no statutory minimum investment for retail investors, but a suitability assessment is required. Redemptions, where offered at all, are limited according to the standards of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2759 (2024).
  • Evergreen and semi-liquid funds: invest on an ongoing basis and redeem units to a limited extent on fixed dates; the price is the estimated NAV, not a market price.
  • Feeder funds and funds of funds: pool smaller amounts for classic funds, with an additional layer of fees.

This overview is not a recommendation for any structure or fund. What matters for the comparison are fees at all levels, redemption rules, valuation methods and leverage at fund level.

Risks

  • Illiquidity: capital is tied up for ten years or longer; a sale on the secondary market can cost a discount, in 2022 according to Saccone (2024) an average of 19% to NAV.
  • Valuation smoothing: estimated NAVs make volatility and correlation look too small (return smoothing).
  • Leverage: in the companies and increasingly at fund level, for example via subscription lines and NAV financing, which according to ILPA (2024) should count as fund-level leverage.
  • Fees and conflicts of interest: two layers of fees in funds of funds; in continuation funds, according to ILPA (2023), the manager is on both sides of the transaction.
  • Capital call risk: calls come when the fund buys. That can also be during crises, when the rest of your wealth has fallen.
  • Dispersion: a single fund can perform considerably worse than the average; a small number of funds means concentration risk.

For advanced readers: what fees and metrics conceal

  • Gross and net: in the example above, the carry alone pushes the return down from 14.87% to 12.47%; management fees come on top and show up in the J-curve, because they are incurred early.
  • Fixed revenue: according to Metrick and Yasuda (2010), successful buyout managers grow mainly through larger successor funds. The business scales better than venture capital, which considerably increases revenue per partner.
  • Metrics with leeway: credit lines boost the IRR (ILPA 2017), and NAV financing brings distributions, and with them the DPI, forward (ILPA 2024).
  • Multiples instead of IRR: Phalippou (2020) argues using multiples and PME, because IRRs can be distorted by early successes and the timing of cash flows.

Limitations and common mistakes

  • Comparing IRR with an index return: money-weighted against time-weighted; PME methods make for a fair comparison.
  • Top-quartile claims: whether a fund is in the top quartile depends on the peer group, the cut-off date and the metric. And according to Harris et al. (2023), interim results say only moderately much about the final result.
  • The wrong benchmark: an unlevered large-cap index makes buyouts look better than they are on a risk-adjusted basis.
  • Feeding smoothed volatility into the optimisation: private equity then gets too much weight.
  • Overestimating liquidity: semi-liquid funds can limit redemptions, precisely when many investors want to sell.

How Portfolio Lab calculates it

Portfolio Lab cannot model fund investments with capital calls and distributions. For private equity, Asset classes offers the series Listed private equity: listed private equity companies, via an ETF from 2007 and a US ETF before that, converted into euros. It fluctuates with the stock market and is not smoothed. If you would rather replicate the risks of buyouts, you can apply leverage to Equities US small cap value in the Backtest. This is a rough public proxy, not a replica of a fund. The app does not calculate fees, carried interest or the J-curve. More in the asset classes methodology.

Frequently asked questions

What is private equity in simple terms?

Equity capital for unlisted companies, usually via funds: they collect commitments from investors, buy companies or stakes in them, develop them for a few years and sell them again. After deduction of fees and the manager's profit share, the gains flow back to the investors.

What returns does private equity deliver?

That depends heavily on the fund, the vintage and the benchmark. For buyout funds after fees, studies find results ranging from a few percentage points below to a few percentage points above the stock market; against leveraged small value stocks, the edge shrinks or disappears.

What is carried interest?

The fund manager's share of profits, almost always 20% of the profits. It usually only becomes payable once investors have got back their capital and a preferred return; with a catch-up, the manager then makes up its full share.

What is the difference between a European and an American waterfall?

In the European model, settlement is across the whole fund: carry is paid only once all investors have received their capital and the preferred return. In the American model, it is per holding: the manager receives carry earlier, but has to repay it via a clawback if later losses follow.

Can I invest in private equity as a retail investor?

Yes, for example via listed private equity companies, ELTIFs, semi-liquid evergreen funds or feeder funds. They differ greatly in liquidity, fees and valuation; listed shares fluctuate like stocks, while fund units can often only be redeemed to a limited extent.

Literature

  1. Europäische Kommission (2024): Delegierte Verordnung (EU) 2024/2759 vom 19. Juli 2024 zur Ergänzung der Verordnung (EU) 2015/760 durch technische Regulierungsstandards (Rücknahmepolitik, Liquiditätsmanagement, Abgleich von Übertragungen, Kosten). Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union vom 25.10.2024, in Kraft seit 26.10.2024; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source
  2. Europäisches Parlament; Rat der Europäischen Union (2023): Verordnung (EU) 2023/606 vom 15. März 2023 zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) 2015/760 in Bezug auf die Anforderungen an die Anlagepolitik und die Bedingungen für die Tätigkeit europäischer langfristiger Investmentfonds sowie in Bezug auf den Umfang der zulässigen Anlagevermögenswerte, die Anforderungen an die Portfoliozusammensetzung und Diversifizierung und die Barkreditaufnahme sowie andere Vertragsbedingungen. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union vom 20.3.2023, anwendbar ab 10.1.2024; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source
  3. Franzoni, Francesco; Nowak, Eric; Phalippou, Ludovic (2012): Private Equity Performance and Liquidity Risk. The Journal of Finance 67 (6), pp. 2341–2373. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01788.x
  4. Harris, Robert S.; Jenkinson, Tim; Kaplan, Steven N. (2014): Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?. The Journal of Finance 69 (5), pp. 1851–1882. doi:10.1111/jofi.12154
  5. Harris, Robert S.; Jenkinson, Tim; Kaplan, Steven N.; Stucke, Ruediger (2023): Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds. Journal of Corporate Finance 81, pp. 102361. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102361
  6. Ilmanen, Antti; Chandra, Swati; McQuinn, Nicholas (2020): Demystifying Illiquid Assets: Expected Returns for Private Equity. The Journal of Alternative Investments 22 (3), pp. 8–22. doi:10.3905/jai.2019.1.086
  7. Institutional Limited Partners Association (2017): Subscription Lines of Credit and Alignment of Interests: Considerations and Best Practices for Limited and General Partners. ILPA, Juni 2017; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source
  8. Institutional Limited Partners Association (2023): Continuation Funds: Considerations for Limited Partners and General Partners. ILPA, Mai 2023; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source
  9. Institutional Limited Partners Association (2024): NAV-Based Facilities: Guidance for Limited Partners and General Partners. ILPA, Juli 2024; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source
  10. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan; Kräussl, Roman; Pollet, Joshua M. (2015): Risk and Expected Returns of Private Equity Investments: Evidence Based on Market Prices. Review of Financial Studies 28 (12), pp. 3269–3302. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv046
  11. Kaplan, Steven N.; Schoar, Antoinette (2005): Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows. The Journal of Finance 60 (4), pp. 1791–1823. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x
  12. Kaplan, Steven N.; Strömberg, Per (2009): Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1), pp. 121–146. doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.121
  13. L’Her, Jean-François; Stoyanova, Rossitsa; Shaw, Kathryn; Scott, William; Lai, Charissa (2016): A Bottom-Up Approach to the Risk-Adjusted Performance of the Buyout Fund Market. Financial Analysts Journal 72 (4), pp. 36–48. doi:10.2469/faj.v72.n4.1
  14. Metrick, Andrew; Yasuda, Ayako (2010): The Economics of Private Equity Funds. Review of Financial Studies 23 (6), pp. 2303–2341. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq020
  15. Phalippou, Ludovic; Gottschalg, Oliver (2009): The Performance of Private Equity Funds. Review of Financial Studies 22 (4), pp. 1747–1776. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn014
  16. Phalippou, Ludovic (2009): Beware of Venturing into Private Equity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23 (1), pp. 147–166. doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.147
  17. Phalippou, Ludovic (2014): Performance of Buyout Funds Revisited?. Review of Finance 18 (1), pp. 189–218. doi:10.1093/rof/rft002
  18. Phalippou, Ludovic (2020): An Inconvenient Fact: Private Equity Returns and the Billionaire Factory. The Journal of Investing 30 (1), pp. 11–39. doi:10.3905/joi.2020.1.153
  19. Saccone, Massimiliano (2024): Times Change: The Era of the Private Equity Denominator Effect. CFA Institute Research and Policy Center, Enterprising Investor, 4.3.2024; abgerufen am 25.10.2026. Source

Full bibliography

This article explains a method; it is not investment or tax advice. Worked examples are simplified and rounded. All terms in the glossary.